

Fiscal rules and fiscal coordination: The Greek watershed?

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Overview: rules & policy coordination

- 1. Economic perspective:
 - Rationale depends on spillovers
 - Theory on gains from policy "cooperation"
 - OCA, Fiscal federalism and club goods
 - In reality, little is known about spillover effects
- 2. Political economy perspective:
 - Obstacle to coordination: gains from coordination are unclear while costs are clear
- 3. Democratic legitimacy perspective:
 - democracy versus coordination in the EMU



1. Economic perspective

- Spillover effects associated with asymmetric shocks or policies justifies the need for coordination
 - Internalization of externalities
 - Absence of coordination= suboptimal outcome (always?)
- In the EMU fiscal policy is the most prominent tool for domestic macroeconomic management => source of spillovers => fiscal rules and fiscal policy coordination
- Problem of spillovers:
 - Empirical literature on spillover effects is limited and rather "inconclusive". Spillovers may depend on
 - On the nature of the shock: Permanent vs. transitory, supply vs. demand, small vs. large
 - On the country's size?
 - On the channels at work: trade/demand, prices and financial linkages
- Rationale for coordination may be weak under certain circumstances and gains are difficult to identify



2. Political economic perspective

- Incentives for coordination rely on gains
 - They are unclear (see literature)
- (political) Costs of coordination can be high
 Example: austerity policies during the crisis
- Perception of national interest vs. Union's interest
 - Optimal level of coordination?
 - Coordination only possible in dramatic situations



3. Democratic legitimacy perspective

- Treaties (and MoU) signed by democratically elected governments
 - They imply acceptance of constraints on domestic economic policy beyond the political term
 - In certain circumstances, the electorate can manifest in a democratic way its opposition to the implications of such commitments (time inconsistency)
 - E.g. Greek referendum (could have been German or Finnish referendum)
- Does it mean that the EMU is incompatible with democracy?
- What conclusions about policy coordination as key element of the E(M)U governance?